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ABSTRACT
We revisit the question of what determines the credibility of macroeconomic policies – here, of
promises to repay public debt. Almost all thinking on the issue has focused on governments’
strategic decision to default (or erode the value of outstanding debt via inflation/devaluation). But
sometimes governments default not because they want to, but because they cannot avoid it: adverse
shocks leave them no option. We build a model in which default/devaluation can occur deliberately
(for strategic reasons) or unavoidably. If such unavoidable fiscal crises a) have pecuniary costs and
b) occur with possible probability, much conventional wisdom on the determinantes of credibility
need no longer hold. For instance, appointing a conservative policymaker or denominating public














Credibility is the mother of good policy, or so claims much recent work
in macroeconomics and international ¯nance. If a government borrows in
foreign currency, it has to show a credible commitment to repay. If it borrows
in its own currency, it has to show a credible commitment not to devalue or
in°ate away the real value of the debt.
But ex post, a well-meaning government may ¯nd it optimal to partially
default in order to raise spending or reduce the distortions caused by high
tax rates. Understanding this temptation, lenders may charge exorbitant
risk premia or refuse to extend credit altogether. This is arguably a key
problem faced by emerging market economies in Latin America, Asia and
Eastern Europe. And with external credit scarce and expensive, the tough
job of investing and growing becomes harder still.
How to deal with this so-called time inconsistency problem?1 The most
common approach involves invisible handcu®s: tie the hands of the policy
maker to prevent him from acting opportunistically. Monetary examples
include rules that punish central bank o±cials for high in°ation, delegation of
policy to an anti-in°ation conservative, currency boards that peg the value of
the currency and make discretionary monetary policy almost impossible and,
if all else fails, the adoption of a foreign currency such as the dollar. Handcu®s
to eliminate sovereign risk in international lending are arguably harder to
design and apply, but they do exist. IMF conditionality and international
¯nes and sanctions on defaulting nations are meant to do precisely that job.
If eliminating opportunistic behavior is the name of the game, the tighter
the handcu®s or the bigger the punishment, presumably the less likely the
policymaker will misbehave. In the models of Barro and Gordon (1983), Ro-
go® (1985) and Fischer and Summers (1989), among many others, tougher or
more rigid policies lead to lower expectations of in°ation/devaluation/default.
This does not mean, of course, that the most rigid policy is necessarily
welfare-maximizing, since in an uncertain economic environment there is a
trade-o® between the credibility and °exibility of policies. But it does mean
that, the greater the temptation to act opportunistically, the stronger is the
case for erring on the side of maximizing credibility, even if it means severely
limiting °exibility. This is the main theoretical justi¯cation for super-rigid
1The concept dates back to the seminal work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Calvo
(1979).
2systems like the currency board in force in Argentina in 1991-2001.
In this paper we argue that this approach to credibility is incomplete and
therefore °awed. Two realistic features are missing from almost all work on
the subject. The ¯rst is that sometimes governments devalue/default not
because they want to, but because they have to. If expenditure is unexpect-
edly high (war calling for high defense expenditures, recession causing an
increase in unemployment compensation payments) and tax revenues cannot
be increased accordingly (either because of political constraints or because
the economy is at the top of its La®er curve), then default may be inevitable
even for a non-opportunistic government.
A second crucial point is that the costs of misbehavior are pecuniary and
involve more that a utility loss for the policymaker, as much of the literature
assumes. Once Argentina abandoned its currency board in 2002, there was
surely loss of face for the country vis a vis the rest of the world and much
discomfort for policymakers, both present and past. But the currency board
was so hard to leave behind precisely because its abandonment involved other
very large pecuniary costs: the breaking or rewriting of contracts, massive
redistributions of wealth between some borrowers and lenders, the paralysis
of the ¯nancial system for months and, soon thereafter, a mega recession
that decimated government revenue.
Putting these two factors together leads to a new and di®erent view of
the relationship between policy rules and credibility. Consider the following
setup, which is a much simpli¯ed version of the model we study below. The
government has debt outstanding, a share µ of which is indexed while a share
1 ¡ µ is nominal and can be defaulted on via devaluation or in°ation. What
remains must be ¯nanced via conventional taxes. Government spending is
stochastic. The policy rule in force allows for devaluations up to x percent,
but calls for paying a pecuniary cost c if devaluation is ever above x. The
amount c is paid by the government out of ¯scal resources. The smaller is x
or the larger is c, the tougher the policy. Social welfare is decreasing in the
rates of devaluation and conventional taxation.
In low-spending states of the world, there is no crisis: the government
meets its obligations through tax collection and a devaluation below x. But
in high-spending states the economy is in a ¯scal crisis: after raising all
possible taxes, the government is forced to devalue more than x and incur
additional costs equal to c. Notice that since this cost worsens the ¯scal
balance, the devaluation required to restore ¯scal equilibrium after the crisis
is increasing in c.
3Such an economy behaves very di®erently than standard theory suggests:
² Expected devaluation (with the expectation computed across crisis and
non-crisis states) can be decreasing in x. This is because the lower is
x the more often crises occur, since large devaluations cannot be used
to respond to shocks without violating the rule. And the more often
crises occur, the more often c is paid. If one thinks of conservatives as
choosing a lower x (as we do below), then appointing a more conserva-
tive policymaker can raise expectations of devaluation. This is exactly
the opposite of what Barro and Gordon (1983), Rogo® (1985), Fischer
and Summers (1989) and others found.
² As long as expected devaluation is decreasing in x, there is no trade-o®
between credibility and °exibility of policy. On the contrary, making
the policy more °exible by raising x also enhances credibility. In fact,
in the range in which expected devaluation is decreasing in x, expected
social welfare is maximized by choosing the highest x in that range.
² If again we think of policymaker preferences determining the chosen
x, it is not necessarily the case that social welfare is maximized by
choosing a policymaker who is more conservative (devaluation-averse)
than society as a whole, as Rogo® (1985) argued. In fact, the welfare-
maximizing policymaker may well be more liberal than society as a
whole.
² Expected devaluation can be increasing in µ, the share of dollarized
(indexed) debt in total public debt. This is because in an uncertain
environment ¯scal crises occur with positive probability, and the higher
is the share of dollarized debt the larger is the devaluation required to
restore ¯scal solvency in crisis situations. This result is exactly the
opposite of Calvo (1988) and Calvo and Guidotti (1990) and of much
conventional wisdom, which argue for dollarizing or indexing debt as a
way to enhance credibility.
² As long as expected devaluation is increasing in µ, there is no trade-o®
between credibility and °exibility of policy. On the contrary, making
the policy more °exible by reducing µ also enhances credibility. In fact,
in the range in which expected devaluation is increasing in µ, expected
social welfare is maximized by choosing the lowest µ in that range.
4² A higher cost ccan cause self-ful¯lling devaluation crises. Two equi-
libria with distinct expected rates of devaluation and expected social
loss (which can be Pareto-ranked) obtain if c is above a certain level.
The intuition is that expecting high devaluation raises interest rates
and raises the ¯scal burden, lowering the threshold between crisis and
non-crisis states. This in turn increases the probability that the high
cost c will be paid and a large devaluation will occur. This result is in
contrast to the results in Obstfeld (1997) and Velasco (1996), where a
su±ciently high cost of devaluing ensures low and unique expectations
of devaluation.
² If the high cost c is needed to induce the policymakers to behave more
conservatively than they would if left to their own devices {as in the
case of IMF conditionality, for instance{ then a tougher (higher c) IMF
program may cause multiple equilibria with distinct expected devalu-
ation and welfare levels. If the economy lands in the bad equilibrium,
then the IMF program may achieve the opposite of what it aimed to.
There is a long and distinguished literature that studies the time incon-
sistency of ¯scal and monetary policies, beginning with the classic papers by
Kydland and Prescott (1977), Calvo (1978) and Lucas and Stokey (1983).
Persson, Persson and Svensson (1987) extend the Lucas and Stokey result
to a monetary economy, while Chang (1998) characterizes time-consistent
equilibria in the Calvo model. Calvo and Guidotti (1990) and Bohn (1990)
study the optimal composition of government debt (between indexed and
non-indexed securities) in the context of a °exibility-credibility trade-o®. A
recent analysis of the relationship between monetary regimes, sovereign risk
and default is in Uribe (2002). But none of these papers considers the role of
crises, de¯ned above as random events that force the policymaker to deviate
from her chosen policy rule.
Drazen and Masson (1994) make a point that is related to ours: if eco-
nomic outcomes are persistent, then following tough policies in the short run
may reduce the credibility of vows to follow tough policies in the future.
Consider what happens if, other things equal, higher unemployment today
means higher unemployment tomorrow. Then if a tough policy raises un-
employment today (and therefore tomorrow), the cost of being tough again
tomorrow goes up, and so does the likelihood that the policymaker will re-
nege on its promises and choose not to act tough. It is in this sense that too
5tough a policy can be counterproductive.2 A related issue, stressed by Flood
(1983) and Blanchard (1985), is that very tough policymakers can end up
being removed from o±ce and replaced by \softer" policymakers.
Analogous arguments can also be found in the corporate ¯nance litera-
ture. An example is Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), who study the incentives
to avoid default in a setup in which sometimes default is beyond a manager's
control. The optimal contract has to trade-o® the bene¯ts of large default
penalties (they deter strategic default) with the costs (such penalties may
have to be paid if default happens in equilibrium even if the manager did
not want to default). There are also similarities with poison pill strategies to
prevent hostile takeovers: too poisonous a pill may lower the expected value
of the ¯rm.
Our paper also has antecedents in the ¯nancial crises literature. Self-
ful¯lling debt and currency crises {involving multiple equilibria{ are studied
by Calvo (1988), Alesina, Prati and Tabellini (1990), Cole and Kehoe (1996),
Velasco (1996) and Obstfeld (1997) among many others. But in all those pa-
pers giving the government the power to precommit {or imposing su±ciently
severe punishments to ensure discretionary policy mimics which would be
chosen under commitment{ is su±cient to rule out multiplicity. The oppo-
site is true in this paper.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up
the basic model, while sections 3 presents an example of equilibria under
a uniform distribution of shocks. Section 4 analyzes the consequences of
two policy alternatives (appointing conservative policymakers and indexing
debt) under the simplifying assumptions of a constant and exogenous cost
of misbehavior. Section 5 endogenizes this cost and analyzes policy options,
while 6 concludes.
2Note that in Drazen and Masson (1994), the only kind of deviation is opportunistic: if
things get su±ciently bad policymakers optimally choose to devalue. There are no crises
which force the policymaker to devalue, as can happen in this paper. There are technical
di®erences as well. Drazen and Masson work with a signaling model in which the public
is uncertain about the policymaker's type. In our model there is full information about
everything.
62 The model
The government budget constraint is
µb + (1 ¡ µ)b(1 + ±
e) + g + z = ¿ + (1 ¡ µ)b± (1)
where b = inherited public debt coming due, g = exogenous net expenditure,
¿ = policy-determined tax revenue, and z = random ¯scal shock, all denomi-
nated in terms of the economy's single tradeable good.3 The variable ± is the
actual devaluation/default rate applied by the government, while ±e is the
expected devaluation rate, which translates into the risk premium charged
on the debt. Hence, on the LHS of (1)is the total ¯scal burden, while the on
RHS are total ¯scal resources, which include tax revenue and proceeds from
devaluation/default.
The budget shock may have to do with random °uctuations in expen-
ditures (war, natural disasters calling for higher transfer payments, reces-
sions requiring higher unemployment compensation) or random °uctuations
in revenues (commodity price shocks a®ecting the pro¯ts of state enterprises,
recessions causing lower value-added tax receipts). Assume that z has a p.d.f.
f (z) with mean zero, upper bound ¹ z and lower bound z.
The parameter µ, which lies between 0 and 1, indicates how much of the
total debt is denominated in foreign currency or indexed, while a fraction 1¡µ
is denominated in domestic currency (or subjected to a possible default). If
all debt is in domestic currency, for instance, µ = 0, and a devaluation
surprise of (±e ¡ ±) yields b(±e ¡ ±) net revenue (in units of output) for the
government. If all debt is in foreign currency or indexed, by contrast, so that
µ = 1, a devaluation surprise yields no real net revenue. If outright default
and not devaluation is involved, a low µ indicates that the ¯nes and legal fees
associated with unexpected default are small, so that a given rate of surprise
default yields a relatively large amount of revenue. The opposite is true if
µ is high. If the actual devaluation/default rate is fully anticipated, so that
±e = ±, then government still has to pay all inherited public debt b. From
now we will speak of devaluation only, but the reader should keep in mind
our result can also be interpreted in terms of outright default. We will refer
to ±e as expected devaluation or the devaluation premium, but under the
3If this good has a price of one in foreign currency and the law of one price holds, then
the domestic price level equals the nominal exchange rate, and in°ation and devaluation
become identical. Below we speak of devaluation, but all results can be reinterpreted in
terms of in°ation.
7alternative interpretation it would be the country risk premium. The larger
±e, the lower the credibility of policies.
We make two key assumptions, on which much of our story hangs:
1 Upper bound on tax revenue: ¿ · ¹ ¿: This limit can arise because of
political constraints on further tax collection or because the economy
¯nds itself at the top of the La®er curve. If the government ever hits
this constraint, it enters a ¯scal crisis. In that case, it has no option
but to devalue or default.
2 Cost of crises: a ¯scal crisis increases the government's liabilities by
an amount c ¸ 0. In the next two sections we treat c as exogenous,
but endogenize it later. One interpretation is that this c includes all
those other liabilities that are easily and cheaply postponed or \rolled
over" under normal circumstances, but not so under a ¯scal crisis.
An alternative is that the IMF or some external monitoring agency
refuses to roll over short-term credits if the government violates ¯scal
conditionality. Or the surprise devaluation that comes with a ¯scal
crisis could cause losses in the domestic private sector (especially in
local banks), which are soon transferred to the government because of
political pressures or concerns over the health of the payments system.
To avoid considering uninteresting sub-cases, we make the following ad-
ditional assumptions about the size of ¹ ¿:
3 No crises on average: ¹ ¿ > g + b. This means that regular taxes are
enough to pay for regular expenditure and service debt if no surprise
takes place (±e = ±) and if the ¯scal shock is no larger than it is on
average.4
4 Default always staves bankruptcy: ¹ ¿ > g + µb + ¹ z + c. This means
that defaulting on all debt that can be defaulted allows government to
¯nance its other expenditures, even if the ¯scal shock is as adverse as
can be.
Finally, we specify the preferences of local residents and of the govern-
ment. Locals have the loss function












where 0 < ®s < 1. Quite naturally, loss is increasing in both devaluation
and taxes. Note that devaluation is costly even if debt is owed to foreigners,
because of standard cost-of-in°ation (or devaluation) arguments, or because
of the other distortions/costs a default might bring. The government has
a loss function that is identical to (2) except that the weight ® it places
on devaluation need not equal ®s. A higher ®s implies a more conservative
government.
The policy problem then boils down to minimizing (2) subject to the
budget constraint, the upper bound on tax collection, and to private sector
devaluation expectations. The timing of actions is as follows. The stock of
debt b and the share 1¡µ of nominal debt are predetermined. Expectations
are formed at the beginning of the period, before uncertainty is realized.
Then the shock hits. After observing the shock, the policymaker chooses her
preferred ± and ¿. Notice that because he moves after expectations are set
and cannot commit to a course of action, the policymaker's optimal plan will
su®er from the adverse consequences of time inconsistency: more devaluation
and higher social loss than under commitment. It is this problem that policies
such as appointing a conservative central banker or dollarizing debt attempt
to solve.
3 Computing equilibrium
Computing the policymaker's preferred strategy is simple. If not against
the maximum tax constraint (¿ < ¹ ¿), he chooses tax and devaluation rates
according to
x = (1 ¡ ¸)(b + x
e + g + z) (3)
¿ = ¸(b + x
e + g + z) (4)
where x ´ (1¡µ)±b is actual revenue raised by devaluation and xe ´ (1¡µ)±eb
is expected revenue raised by devaluation. Notice that ¸ ´ ®
(1¡®)(1¡µ)2+® < 1
is increasing in µ and in ®. These rules nest some intuitive and common
examples. For instance, if ® = 1 (devaluation default very costly for the
9policymaker) or if µ = 1 (debt totally dollarized or indexed), the policy
involves no devaluation whatsoever.
From now on we refer to (3) and (4) as the policy rules. Deviating from
these rules will prompt a punishment or cost c. As discussed above, the idea
is that both local residents and foreign creditors know (3) and (4) and can
observe if they are being followed. If they are not, all kinds of undesirable
economic consequences occur, which have a cost c for the government.
De¯ne z¤ as the realization of expenditure such that taxes are at their
maximum level:
¹ ¿ = ¸(b + x
e + g + z
¤) (5)
This level z¤ is a trigger or threshold. If ¡(b + xe + g) · z · z¤, then the
¯scal situation is strong and policy rules (4) and (3) determine ¿ and x.5
But if the shock is larger and z > z¤, then the economy is in a ¯scal crisis
and ¿ = ¹ ¿. In this case, the government cannot abide by (3) and (4) above.
Actual devaluation is given by
x = b + x
e + g + c + z ¡ ¹ ¿; (6)
where now c must be paid out of government resources.
Figure 1 shows x as a function of the shock z. The ¯gure depicts two
distinct regions. From now on we label the range ¡(b + xe + g) · z · z¤ as
the no crisis region and the range z > z¤ as the crisis region. Denote the
probability of the former as pnc and the probability of the later as pc.6











where the threshold z¤ is given by
z





Using Leibnitz's rule one can calculate
@E(xjxe)
@xe = (1 ¡ ¸)p
nc + p
c + cf(z
¤) > 0; (9)
5Note that z < ¡(b + xe + g) implies that the total ¯scal burden is b + xe + g + z. If
z < ¡(b + xe + g), there is no need to default on debt or to raise any taxes.
6Note these probabilities need not add up to one, since there can be a portion of
the support of the distribution in which the shock is so favorable that both taxes and
devaluation are zero.
10so that E(xjxe) is increasing in xe. The second derivative of E(xjxe) is
@2E(xjxe)





From now on we assume that f0(z) · 0 (which is satis¯ed for many com-
monly used distributions: uniform and Poisson are two examples). With
this assumption, E(xjxe) is convex in xe as long as z¤ ¸ z. As xe grows,
eventually z¤ < z; in that range, E(xjxe) is a straight line with slope equal
to one (in other words, in that range E(xjxe) = b + g + xe + c ¡ ¹ ¿).
Finally, expectations are formed rationally. Equilibrium expected deval-
uation (xe






There are three possible cases:
² Case 1: One equilibrium, as depicted in Figure 2.1. In this case, 0 <
@E(xjxe)
@xe · 1 at the equilibrium xe. Therefore, shifting up the E(xjxe)
curve (for instance by raising b or g) results in a larger xe
eq. This case
holds if and only if c < ¹ ¿ ¡ b ¡ g (recall the quantity on the RHS is
positive by assumption). In words, c has to be relatively small.
² Case 2: No equilibrium, as depicted in Figure 2.2. This is the case of
a very large c.
² Case 3: Two equilibria, as depicted in Figure 2.3. In this case, 0 <
@E(xjxe)
@xe · 1 at the low equilibrium xe
eq1 and
@E(xjxe)
@xe > 1 at the high
equilibrium xe
eq2. This case requires a larger c than in case 1 but a
smaller one than in case 2. Shifting up the E(xjxe) curve results in a
larger xe
eq1 and a smaller xe
eq2.
An important implication of this is that a su±ciently large c can cause
multiple equilibria, possibly shifting the economy from Case 1 to Case 2.
The intuition is that starting from a position of equilibrium, expecting higher
devaluation raises the ¯scal burden, lowering the threshold between crisis and
non-crisis states. This in turn increases the probability that the high cost c
will be paid and a large devaluation will occur, thereby making the initial
increase in expected devaluation self-validating.7
7This cannot happen if c = 0 because of the following. In non crisis states, x =
11If a second equilibrium exists and bad \animal spirits" can cause a shift
to it, self-ful¯lling pessimism could cause crises.8. An announcement on
the part of external creditors, for instance, that they would not reschedule
loans coming due if the government devalues, could be enough to trigger
an equilibrium shift and the very devaluation the creditors were presumably
trying to avoid.
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which we write more compactly as
E (L) = ¤(¸;µ;z
¤;x
e;c) (13)
Recall z¤ and xe are also functions of ¸. Expected loss depends on what share
of the ¯scal burden is ¯nanced by devaluation in non-crisis states, what the
threshold is between crisis and non-crisis states, and what the expectation of
devaluation is across all states.
4 Equilibria: an example
To gain more insight into the sources of multiplicity of equilibria, consider
the following example. Suppose the distribution of z is uniform, with lower
bound ¡¹ z and upper bound ¹ z. Country-risk equation (7) then implies
(1¡¸)(b + g + xe + z), so that a given increase in xe yields a less than one-for-one increase
in x. In crisis states x = b + g + xe + z ¡ ¹ ¿, so that x increases one-for-one with xe. The
rational expectation of x is the weighted average of these two cases, with the weights given
by the relevant probabilities. But whatever the weights, the increase is always less than
one-for-one, so an exogenous rise in xe can never be self-validating.
8This is a static model, so we cannot say much about the stability properties of both
equilibria. Arguably the lower or good equilibrium is stable under tatonment and the
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where ¢z ´ ¹ z+z¤ is the length of the interval in which no ¯scal crises occur.
At the same time, trigger equation (5) becomes
x
e






These equations are depicted in Figure 3. It is easy to prove that the func-
tion labeled DR (for expected devaluation revenue) is positive, decreasing,
convex, continuous and di®erentiable in the interval (0;2¹ z). These proper-
ties imply that a unique equilibrium exists as long as that DR crosses the
vertical axis above the function labeled TR (for trigger). This last condition
is equivalent to ¹ ¿ > b + g + c. This con¯rms for this example our earlier
¯nding that uniqueness requires that the cost c be su±ciently small.9
5 The e®ects of policy
Policies a®ecting ¸;c;b;g or ¹ ¿ result in shifts of E(xjxe) and equilibrium
expected devaluation and expected social loss. Next we examine the e®ects of
some of these policies. In this section we assume away the issue of multiplicity
of equilibria and focus on cases in which uniqueness obtains.
5.1 A conservative policymaker µ a la Rogo®
A conservative policymaker has a high ® and therefore su®ers big utility losses
from devaluation. Plausibly, ® > ®s, so that he su®ers more from devaluation
9In this particularly simple case, the endogenous variables have closed-form solutions.
If TR cuts DR to the left of ¿ (1 ¡ ¸)
¡1 (this requires 4(1 ¡ ¸)(¹ ¿ ¡ c ¡ b ¡ g) < ¹ z ¡ 2c),
we have:
z¤






c2 + 4(1 ¡ ¸)(¹ ¿ ¡ c ¡ b ¡ g)¹ z
´
: (16)
Alternatively, if TR cuts DR to the right of ¿ (1 ¡ ¸)
¡1, the solution is:
z¤




¸¹ ¿ + (1 ¡ ¸)c ¡
q
(¸¹ ¿ + (1 ¡ ¸)c)
2 ¡ 4¹ z(1 ¡ ¸)2(b + g + ¹ ¿ + c) ¡ ¸¹ ¿2
¶
With these results, expected devaluation can be computed using 15 in the text.
13than does the population at large. What are the e®ects of delegating policy
to someone with such preferences?
Notice that the conventional model is a special case of our model: the
case in which ¹ ¿ is su±ciently large, so that there are no ¯scal crises. In that
case policy rule (3) holds in all states. Taking expectations on both sides of
that expression, using the de¯nitions of ¸ and of xe, and rearranging we have
that:
±








so that ±e is unambiguously decreasing in ®. A more conservative policy-
maker is associated with lower expected devaluation. The intuition is obvi-
ous: the more the policymaker dislikes devaluation, the less of it he engineers
in equilibrium.
Matters are very di®erent when crises are positive. Recall that ¸ is in-
creasing in ® and that xe = (1 ¡ µ)±eb. Therefore, for a given µ, the change













In what follows we focus on dxe










For small values of c this derivative is negative, and we have the standard
case: a conservative central banker delivers lower expected devaluation.10
But the opposite case is also possible. If c is large enough, the derivative
is positive. That means that an increase in ®, with the consequent increase
in ¸, shifts up E(xjxe) and therefore increases xe. The appointment of a
more conservative policy-maker will reduce expected devaluation if c is small
enough, but increase it otherwise.
The intuition is as follows. Comparing two economies under di®erent
policy regimes, one with a conservative policy maker (high ®) and another
10Note the term b + g + z + xe is always non-negative by construction, since we are
integrating over the interval where ¡(b + g + xe) · z · z¤.
14with a lax policymaker (low ®), we see three possible outcomes depending
on the realization of z:
² If the shock z is small enough, neither economy is in a ¯scal crisis. In
this case, the economy with the more conservative policymaker has less
devaluation.
² If the shock z is large enough, both economies are in a ¯scal crisis. In
this case, both economies have the same amount of devaluation.
² If the shock is of intermediate size, then the economy with the lax
policymaker is not in crisis, but that with the conservative policymaker
is. In this case, the latter economy has higher expected devaluation if
cis large.
In computing expectations, agents average across these three possible
situations. With su±ciently large costs c, the relatively high devaluation
su®ered by conservative policymakers when in the third situation more than
o®sets the relatively low devaluation they enjoy when in the ¯rst situation,
so that \on average" conservatives engineer more devaluation, and this is
rationally anticipated by the public. This line of reasoning also makes clear
why, if c = 0, conservatives always deliver lower expected devaluation.
This can also be seen by writing the condition for
@E(xjxe)
@¸ > 0 (equation
(19)) as







using the fact that, for a given xe, @z¤
@¸ = ¡ ¹ ¿
¸2. The LHS is the marginal
reduction in expected devaluation when ¸ increases and no crisis takes place.
It is positive, for more conservative (higher ¸) policymakers default less when
there is no crisis. The RHS is the marginal increase in expected costs (¯-
nanced via devaluation) associated to a marginally more conservative govern-
ment. It is also a positive number, since @z¤
@¸ < 0 . In words, more conservative
policymakers are in crisis more often. If the latter e®ect exceeds the former,
then a more conservative policy maker delivers higher expected devaluation.
The upper panels in ¯gures 4 and 5 illustrate both possible cases. Again
we use a uniform distribution with support [¡¹ z; ¹ z]. In 4 we depict a case with
relatively high ¹ ¿ and c = 0. This means that, for a given ¹ z (recall the standard
deviation of the shock is proportional to ¹ z), crises do not happen often,
15and when they do they involve zero costs. As the ¯gure shows, expected
devaluation is always decreasing in ®.
The example in Figure 5 has the same parameters as Figure 4, except for
a lower maximum tax revenue ¹ ¿ and a large c. For low ®'s the traditional
result holds and a more conservative policymaker delivers lower expected
devaluation. But for ®'s larger than 0.41 the opposite happens and a more
conservative policy maker delivers higher expected devaluation.
What about the consequences for welfare? Recall Rogo® showed that, in
the presence of time inconsistency, the policymaker that delivers the highest
social welfare is one who has more conservative preferences than society as
a whole. That celebrated result need not hold here. We can compute the
e®ects of policy on welfare using (13) above. Denote by ¤y (:) the partial


















so that ¤¸ = 0 when ®g = ®s, as it must be since the chosen ¸ is, for a
given xe, the optimum for both the government and for society. Clearly ¤¸
is negative (positive) if ® is smaller (larger) than ®s.












¤) · 0; (22)
so that expected loss is decreasing in the threshold z¤ whenever the cost cis
positive. Intuitively, as z¤ rises and the economy spends less time in crises,
the cost has to be paid less often, and this reduces expected loss.
Finally, it is easy to check that ¤xe > 0everywhere: higher expected
devaluation raises the ¯scal burden and therefore expected loss.
With this information in hand we can now say something about the e®ect
of policymaker preferences on social welfare. Note that
dE (L)
d¸
= ¤¸ + ¤z¤
@z¤
@¸




where we have used the fact that @z¤
@xe = ¡1. The ¯rst term on the RHS of this
expression is positive for ® ¸ ®s. So is the second term, since @z¤
@¸ = ¡ ¹ ¿
¸2 < 0.
In the third term, the expression in parentheses is always positive, so the sign
of the third term depends on whether dxe
d¸ is positive or negative.
16To make progress consider a special point along (23), and evaluate
dE(L)
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Note that the celebrated Rogo® result is a special case that holds when c = 0.
In that situation, ¤z¤ = 0and dxe
d¸
¯ ¯ ¯
®=®s < 0, so the RHS of (24) is unam-
biguously negative. Social loss falls as the policymaker becomes marginally
more conservative than society as a whole. This situation is illustrated in
the lower panel of Figure 4, where we have assumed ®s = 0:5, and where the
socially optimal level of ® is equal to 0.65.
If c > 0, on the other hand, we have two subcases. If dxe
d¸
¯ ¯ ¯
®=®s < 0, so
that the conventional link between expected devaluation and policymaker
preferences obtains, the RHS has an ambiguous sign. It pays o® to be more
conservative than society if and only if the cost cis small (so that ¤z¤is close
to zero) while ¡dxe
d¸
¯ ¯ ¯
®=®s is large (a more conservative policymaker sharply
reduces expected devaluation).




®=®s > 0, so that we have the non-
conventional result that greater liberalism causes expected devaluation to
fall. In that case, the RHS of (24) is unambiguously positive. The social
optimum involves a policymaker who is more liberal than society as a whole.
This case is illustrated in the lower panel of Figure 5, where we again assumed
®s = 0:5, and where the socially optimal level of ® is equal to 0.41.
5.2 Dollarization and indexation
We saw above that one interpretation of the parameter µ is the share of debt
that is denominated in foreign currency or indexed (for instance to the price
level). A common policy is to increase µ, so that a devaluation/in°ation
surprise yields little real revenue. Understanding this, the logic goes, govern-
ments will devalue/in°ate less in equilibrium.11 The currently fashionable
policy of \dollarization," for instance (applied in Ecuador and El Salvador
and hotly discussed in Argentina) consists in this context of driving µ all the
way to one.
What e®ects does this policy have? Note ¯rst that the standard model
without crises {for instance Fischer and Summers (1989){ would yield a
11See for instance Calvo (1988) and Fischer and Summers (1989).
17monotonically decreasing relationship between expected devaluation and the
share µ of dollarized debt. The intuition is that since as µ rises devaluation
becomes less productive (it yields less revenue for the same devaluation rate),
it is used less in equilibrium. That happens here if the maximum tax ¹ ¿ is
never binding, so that there are no crises and policy rule (3) holds in all
states. As we saw in the previous subsection (see equation (17)), in that case
±e is unambiguously decreasing in µ, so that a higher share of dollarized debt
means less expected devaluation.
Here matters are again di®erent because of the possibility of crises. We
know that µ a®ects xeonly through ¸ and that ±e = xe























Hence, greater dollarization reduces devaluation expectations if and only
if the elasticity of xe with respect to ¸ is smaller than 1
2
1¡®
1¡¸. This means that
even if c is zero, so that dxe
d¸ is unambiguously negative, greater dollarization
will decrease expected revenues from devaluation but may increase expected
devaluation.
The intuition is that now changing µ not only alters ¸, and therefore the
share of government obligations that is ¯nanced via default. Changing µ also
changes the stock of debt that can be defaulted on, so that for every dollar
of revenue the government hopes to get from default, higher dollarization
(raising µ) requires a higher default rate.
In a crisis the default rate is not for the policymaker to choose, but given
by revenue needs. It follows that, for a given amount of required revenue,
the default rate in crises is higher the larger is the share µ of nominal debt.
In addition, a larger µ means that the threshold z¤ falls, so that the economy
is in crises more often. Either or both of these e®ects can o®set the standard
Fischer-Summers type of result, causing expected devaluation to rise as the
share of dollarized debt increases. An example of this can be seen in the top
panel of Figure 6, where the schedule has an upward-sloping portion.12
12Note however that if c = 0 changing the threshold has no impact on ±e, so that in
Figure 6 the upward-sloping portion comes exclusively from the ¯rst e®ect.
18What about the welfare implications of dollarization/indexation of liabil-






























2 > 0 (28)
It follows that the welfare analysis of indexation/dollarization is the same
as the welfare analysis of policymaker conservatism, but with a twist. There
is now an additional e®ect: for a given ¸, decreasing µ(indexing/dollarizing
more) always increases social loss, since it is the attempted devaluation (±b)
not its actual yield (µ±b) that enters social loss.
Other things equal, then, trying to lower expected devaluation and in-
crease welfare via greater indexation-dollarization is a trickier business than
doing so via a more conservative policymaker. Consider for simplicity the























Therefore, whenever expected devaluation is increasing in ¸ and therefore in
µ, expected social loss is increasing in µ. In other words, in the range of µ
for which @xe
@¸ is positive, it pays o® to have as little indexation-dollarization
as possible.
















We know the ¯rst term on the RHS is in this case negative, and the second
term on the RHS is always positive. It follows the net e®ect can have either
sign, and greater indexation/dollarization can be bad for welfare even if crises
are costless. This case is depicted in the lower panel of Figure 6, in which
expected social loss is decreasing in µ until this share hits 0.48, and increases
thereafter.
196 Endogenizing the cost of default
So far we have treated the cost c of a crisis as exogenous. But it can easily
be endogenized by appealing to incentive e®ects.
It is not always feasible to ¯nd a tough central banker or ¯nance minister
who has a strong dislike of devaluation or default. That person may not exist,
or he may be inevitably changed once in power. An external agency, such as
the IMF, may attempt to commit the government to a low devaluation rate
by imposing a penalty for c for deviations.
Suppose that the IMF wants to induce the government to follow a given
policy rule, characterized by a given ® (call it ®f) and its associated ¸ (call
it ¸f). If the government ever deviates from this policy, then it must pay the
cost c. Naturally, the IMF will wish to impose the smallest c that ensures
the rule is followed as long as possible.13 The appendix shows that for each
chosen ¸f there is a c¤ equal to
c










> 0 is a function of ¸f and ¸. As long as the cost of
deviating is no smaller than c¤, the government will always attempt to stick





appendix it follows that this function is increasing in ¸f if and only if ¸f > ¸.
Hence, if the IMF wants to raise ¸f above ¸, it must also increase c¤.
What is the e®ect of a higher ¸f on expectations of devaluation? Consider

















The sign of this derivative depends on ¸f itself. A more ambitious target (a
higher ®f, meaning a higher ¸f) may cause expectations of default to fall or
rise. Evaluating (32) in the extremes (¸f = ¸ and ¸f = 0) one obtains
13By as long as possible we mean that if it hits the maximum-tax constraint, the gov-
ernment will have to deviate from the IMF-imposed policy even if it does not want to.
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The right hand side of (33) is always negative; imposing a tighter policy
starting from ¸f = ¸ reduces E(xjxe). This is because the required marginal
increase in c¤, starting from ¸f = ¸, is zero. But a `zero tolerance' policy
of ¸f = 1 can back¯re: the RHS of (34) may be positive, in which case a
decrease in ¸f is required to reduce expectations of devaluation. An example
appears in the top panel of Figure 7, where expected devaluation ¯rst falls
and then rises as ®f (and therefore ¸f) increases.
What are the implications for welfare? Should the IMF force the lo-
cal policymaker to act more conservatively than the policymaker naturally
would? We can use the same technique as in earlier sections, calculating
dE (L)
d¸f = ¤¸f + ¤z¤
@z¤





where it is easy to check from (12) that
¤c =
®s
µ2 E (x j crisis)p
c > 0 (36)
Focus ¯rst on the case with ® = ®s, so that the government has the same
preferences as society. Given that the marginal increase in the cost needed









which is negative since @xe
@¸f < 0 for c = 0. Therefore, having the IMF induce
a policy that is more conservative than both society and the government
is optimal. That is, if ® = ®s, the best ®f is ®f > ®. The intuition is
that raising the policymakers ® to ®f > ® has marginal bene¯ts and costs.
The marginal bene¯t is that in non-crisis situations, a more conservative
policymaker ameliorates the time inconsistency problem.14 The marginal cost
14And starting from ®s = ®g, making the policy maker marginally more conservative
increases welfare, as Rogo® proved, since the gain from enhanced credibility more than
o®sets the loss from less °exibility in responding to shocks.
21is that in crisis situations a cost c has to be paid, and the more conservative
the policymaker is, the more often crises happen. But starting at ®f = ®
this marginal cost is zero, since the marginal increase in c required to make
that ®f sustainable is zero.15 This case appears in the lower panel of Figure
7.













which may be positive or negative, since the sum of the ¯rst two terms, as
we know, is of ambiguous sign, and ¤c > 0. That is, having the IMF induce
a policy that is more conservative than society could be welfare decreasing
if the government is su±ciently liberal, so that the c needed to sustain the
IMF policy is large.
What is the connection between how tough an IMF program is and
uniqueness of equilibria? It turns out that a su±ciently tough or ambitious
program {that is, one with a high ®f{ can cause multiple equilibria. The
intuition is that forcing a government to behave much more conservatively
than it would if left to its own devices calls for a large cost c. And, as we saw
in sections 2 and 3 above, a large enough ccan generate multiple equilibria.
As in those sections, the intuition is that expectations of high devaluation
raise the ¯scal burden, shifting the threshold between crisis and non crisis
states. A large c is then paid with higher probability, worsening the ex-
pected ¯scal burden and potentially rendering the pessimistic expectations
self-con¯rming.
This result stands in contrast with those of Obstfeld (1997). In that
paper, escape clauses with exogenous costs can involve self-ful¯lling attacks
on ¯xed exchange rates if those costs are su±ciently small. In Obstfeld's
paper escape costs are non-pecuniary and a®ect the policymaker's utility
only. The higher the cost, the less willing is the policymaker to validate high
devaluation expectations. Here escape costs are pecuniary and they a®ect
the government's budget constraint. This is precisely why these high costs
allow pessimistic expectations to be self-validating.
An example of this phenomenon appears in Figure 8. As ®f (and there-










22servative IMF programs) the equilibrium is no longer unique. There is an
alternative outcome that yields higher expected devaluation and expected
social loss. In that range, which equilibrium obtains depends exclusively on
animal spirits. By being more ambitious, the IMF may end up increasing
the very expected devaluation it was attempting to reduce.
7 Conclusions
Do tougher policies deliver higher credibility, lower expectations of devalua-
tion and default, and possibly higher welfare? Conventional wisdom typically
says yes. The model in this paper suggests otherwise. In an uncertain en-
vironment in which ¯scal crises are both possible and costly, tough policies
such as greater policymaker conservatism and rising dollarization/indexation
of government debt can easily back¯re, causing higher expected devaluation
and lower welfare.
This does not mean that any toughening of policies is counterproductive.
On the contrary, we have shown that the relationship between expected de-
valuation and expected social loss, on the one hand, and the toughness of
policies, on the other, can be non-monotonic and quite sensitive to changes
in underlying parameters. But our results do suggest that toughness beyond
a certain point may be welfare reducing, and that this threshold may be dif-
ferent from what conventional theory suggests. For instance, the well-known
result that it is welfare-improving to appoint a conservative policy-maker
need not hold here.
Not all tough policies are created equal. The paper also suggests that
indexing or dollarizing debt may be particularly tricky. Appointing a con-
servative policymaker may cause crises to occur more often, but has no im-
plications for the ability of the government to default/devalue as needed in
times of crisis. That is why conservatism may be welfare-improving if the
¯scal costs of crisis are small, as we show in sections 4 and 5. Dollarization
of debts, on the other hand, or measures such as facilitating the imposition
of sanctions or penalties on defaulting nations, reduce the revenue collected
by governments for every possible devaluation rate. This means that, other
things equal, default rates are higher at times of crisis, and expected deval-
uation and expected social loss may well be higher.16
16Fischer and Summers (1989) make a related point, arguing that what they term poli-
cies of in°ation protection, may be welfare improving when in°ation is imperfectly con-
23We have developed the argument in terms of a ¯scal problem, but the
same logic could be applied more broadly. For instance, it could be applied to
the in°ation-unemployment trade-o® for which the idea of time inconsistency
was originally developed. If the expectations-augmented Phillips curve is
subject to shocks and if there is a politically-dictated upper bound to the
rate of unemployment (as their arguably is in the real world), then a very
similar story applies. Often-advocated policies, such as indexing wages to
insulate them from in°ation, thereby making in°ation surprises useless in
terms of employment, could also have counter-productive e®ects.
trolled by the policymaker.
24A Appendix


















(b + g + z + x
e)
2 (39)
But if against the maximum tax constraint, the government has to deviate
from the IMF policy even if it does not want to. This means that the worst
realization of z for which (39) is relevant turn out to be z¤, which is given




















By contrast, if the government deviates from the IMF prescription and ap-
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2 ; (41)

















The government will not deviate for any z · z¤ as long as (39) is no larger
than (41), implying




















Equation (43) de¯nes the lowest feasible c, which we call c¤. Note that if
¸f = ¸, Ã = 1, so deviation is never preferred (given that c is non-negative).





is decreasing in ¸f if and only if ¸f < ¸.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium country risk and expected social loss with costs c = 0.

























Figure 5: Equilibrium country risk and expected social loss with costs c = 4.






















Figure 6: Equilibrium country risk and expected social loss with costs c = 0.

























Figure 7: Equilibrium country risk and expected social loss with endogenous




























Figure 8: Equilibrium country risk and expected social loss with endogenous
costs. (¹ z = 1:5;µ = 1;b = 12; ¹ ¿ = 5;g = ¡8:5;® = 0:5)